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Computational Analysis of the Menu of U.S.-Japan Trade Policies* 
 
Drusilla K. Brown, Tufts University 
Kozo Kiyota, Yokohama National University** 
Robert M. Stern, University of Michigan 
I. Introduction 
In this paper, we present a computational analysis of the economic effects of the menu of 
U.S.-Japan trade policies.  The menu encompasses the various U.S. and Japan bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements (FTAs) that had been negotiated and the negotiations currently in 
process in August 2004 when this paper was originally written, unilateral removal of existing 
trade barriers by the United States, Japan, and their FTA partner countries, and global 
(multilateral) free trade.  The analysis is based on the Michigan Model of World Production and 
Trade.  The Michigan Model is a multi-country/multi-sector computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the global trading system that has been used for more than three decades to 
analyze the economic effects of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade negotiations and a 
variety of other changes in trade and related policies.   
In Section II following, we present a brief description of the main features and data of the 
Michigan Model.  The results of the computational analysis of the U.S. and Japan FTAs are 
presented in Sections III and IV.  In Section V, we consider the cross-country patterns of the 
welfare effects of the various FTAs.  In Section VI, we provide a broader perspective on the 
FTAs that takes into account the effects of the unilateral and multilateral removal of trade barriers 
by the United States and Japan, their FTA partner countries, and other countries/regions in the 
global trading system.  Section VII provides a summary and concluding remarks.   
________________________ 
*This paper has been adapted from Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2006).  We wish to thank Masahiko 
Tsutsumi and participants in the March 2004 pre-conference meeting in Ann Arbor and the May 2004 
Tokyo conference for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. 
**Kozo Kiyota was a Visiting Scholar at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, when this paper was 
prepared and would like to thank the Kikawada Fellowship Program for providing financial support for the 
research. 
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II. The Michigan Model of World Production and Trade 
Overview of the Michigan Model 
 The version of the Michigan Model that we use in this paper covers 18 economic sectors, 
including agriculture, manufactures, and services, in each of 22 countries/regions. The 
distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates some aspects of trade with 
imperfect competition, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and product 
variety.  Some details follow.1  A more complete description of the formal structure and equations 
of the model can be found on line at www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/. 
Sectors and Market Structure 
 As mentioned, the version of the model used consists of 18 production sectors and 22 
countries/regions (plus rest-of-world).  The sectoral and country/region coverage are indicated in 
the tables below.  Agriculture is modeled as perfectly competitive with product differentiation by 
country of origin, and all other sectors covering manufactures and services are modeled as 
monopolistically competitive.  Each monopolistically competitive firm produces a differentiated 
product and sets price as a profit-maximizing mark-up of price over marginal cost.  Free entry and 
exit of firms then guarantees zero profits. 
Expenditure 
 Consumers and producers are assumed to use a two-stage procedure to allocate expenditure 
across differentiated products. In the first stage, expenditure is allocated across goods without 
regard to the country of origin or producing firm. At this stage, the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, 
and the production function requires intermediate inputs in fixed proportions. In the second stage, 
expenditure on monopolistically competitive goods is allocated across the competing varieties 
supplied by each firm from all countries. In the perfectly competitive agricultural sector, since 
                                                 
1 See also Deardorff and Stern (1990, esp. pp. 9-46) and Brown and Stern (1989a,b). 
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individual firm supply is indeterminate, expenditure is allocated over each country’s sector as a 
whole, with imperfect substitution between products of different countries. 
 The aggregation function in the second stage is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
function.  Use of the CES function and product differentiation by firm imply that consumer welfare 
is influenced both by any reduction in real prices brought about by trade liberalization, as well as 
increased product variety.  The elasticity of substitution among different varieties of a good is 
assumed to be three, a value that is broadly consistent with available empirical estimates.  The 
parameter for the sensitivity of consumers to the number of product varieties is set at 0.5.2 
Production 
 The production function is separated into two stages. In the first stage, intermediate inputs 
and a primary composite of capital and labor are used in fixed proportion to output.3  In the second 
stage, capital and labor are combined through a CES function to form the primary composite. In the 
monopolistically competitive sectors, additional fixed inputs of capital and labor are required. It is 
assumed that fixed capital and fixed labor are used in the same proportion as variable capital and 
variable labor so that production functions are homothetic.  The elasticities of substitution between 
capital and labor vary across sectors and were derived from a literature search of empirical 
estimates of sectoral supply elasticities.  Economies of scale are determined endogenously in the 
model. 
Supply Prices  
 To determine equilibrium prices, perfectly competitive firms operate such that price is 
equal to marginal cost, while monopolistically competitive firms maximize profits by setting price 
as an optimal mark-up over marginal cost. The numbers of firms in sectors under monopolistic 
                                                 
2 If the variety parameter is greater than 0.5, it means that consumers value variety more.  If the parameter 
is zero, consumers have no preference for variety.  This is the same as the Armington assumption according 
to which consumers view products as distinguished by country of production.  Sensitivity tests of 
alternative parameter values are included in an appendix below. 
3 Intermediate inputs include both domestic and imported varieties. 
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competition are determined by the zero profits condition.  The free entry condition in this context is 
also the basic mechanism through which new product varieties are created (or eliminated).  Each of 
the  new entrants arrives with a distinctly different product, expanding the array of goods available 
to consumers. 
 Free entry and exit are also the means through which countries are able to realize the 
specialization gains from trade.  In this connection, it can be noted that in a model with nationally 
differentiated products, which relies on the Armington assumption, production of a particular 
variety of a good cannot move from one country to another.  In such a model, there are gains from 
exchange but no gains from specialization.  However, in the Michigan Model with differentiated 
products supplied by monopolistically competitive firms, production of a particular variety is 
internationally mobile.  A decline in the number of firms in one country paired with an expansion in 
another essentially implies that production of one variety of a good is being relocated from the 
country in which the number of firms is declining to the country in which the number of firms is 
expanding.  Thus, we have both an exchange gain and a specialization gain from international 
trade.4 
Capital and Labor Markets 
 Capital and labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors within each country. 
Returns to capital and labor are determined so as to equate factor demand to an exogenous supply of 
each factor. The aggregate supplies of capital and labor in each country are assumed to remain fixed 
so as to abstract from macroeconomic considerations (e.g., the determination of investment), since 
our microeconomic focus is on the inter-sectoral allocation of resources. 
                                                 
4 The international relocation of a particular variety of a good can be understood in the context of the ongoing 
outsourcing debate.  Domestic firms require intermediate inputs, in addition to capital and labor.  To the extent 
that tariff reduction leads a firm to substitute toward traded intermediate inputs, domestic firms can be thought 
of as outsourcing some component of production.  This is particularly the case if there is a decline in the 
number of domestic firms in the sector from which intermediate inputs are purchased and an expansion in the 
supplier country. 
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World Market  and Trade Balance 
 The world market determines equilibrium prices such that all markets clear.  Total demand 
for each firm or sector’s product must equal total supply of that product. It is also assumed that 
trade remains balanced for each country/region, that is, any initial trade imbalance remains constant 
as trade barriers are changed. This is accomplished by permitting aggregate expenditure to adjust to 
maintain a constant trade balance.  Thus, we abstract away from the macroeconomic forces and 
policies that are the main determinants of trade imbalances.  Further, it should be noted that there 
are no nominal rigidities in the model.  As a consequence, there is no role for a real exchange rate 
mechanism. 
Trade Policies and Rent/Revenues 
 We have incorporated into the model the import tariff rates and export taxes/subsidies as 
policy inputs that are applicable to the bilateral trade of the various countries/regions with respect 
to one another.  These have been computed using the "GTAP–5.4 Database" provided in 
Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). This was the latest database available at the time of writing 
in 2006.  The export barriers have been estimated as export-tax equivalents.  We assume that 
revenues from both import tariffs and export taxes, as well as rents from NTBs on exports, are 
redistributed to consumers in the tariff- or tax-levying country and are spent like any other 
income. 
 Tariff liberalization can affect economic efficiency through three main channels.  First, in 
the context of standard trade theory, tariff reductions both reduce the cost of imports for consumers 
and for producers purchasing traded intermediate inputs, thus producing an exchange gain.  Second, 
tariff removal leads firms to direct resources toward those sectors that have the greatest value on the 
world market.  That is, we have the standard specialization gain.  Third, tariff reductions have a pro-
competitive effect on sellers.  Increased price pressure from imported varieties force incumbent 
firms to cut price.  Surviving firms remain viable by expanding output, thereby moving down their 
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average total cost (ATC) curve. The consequent lower ATC of production creates gains from the 
realization of economies of scale. 
Model Closure and Implementation 
 We assume in the model that aggregate expenditure varies endogenously to hold aggregate 
employment constant.  This closure is analogous to the Johansen closure rule (Deardorff and Stern, 
1990, pp. 27-29). The Johansen closure rule consists of keeping the requirement of full employment 
while dropping the consumption function. This means that consumption can be thought of as 
adjusting endogenously to ensure full employment. However, in the present model, we do not 
distinguish consumption from other sources of final demand. That is, we assume instead that total 
expenditure adjusts to maintain full employment. 
 The model is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). When policy 
changes are introduced into the model, the method of solution yields percentage changes in sectoral 
employment and certain other variables of interest. Multiplying the percentage changes by the 
absolute levels of the pertinent variables in the database yields the absolute changes, positive or 
negative, which might result from the various liberalization scenarios. 
Interpreting the Modeling Results 
To help the reader interpret the modeling results, it is useful to review the features of the 
model that serve to identify the various economic effects to be reflected in the different 
applications of the model.  Although the model includes the aforementioned features of imperfect 
competition, it remains the case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much the same way 
that they would with perfect competition.  That is, when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced 
in a sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) substitute toward imports and the 
domestic competing industry contracts production while foreign exporters expand.  Thus, in the 
case of multilateral liberalization that reduces tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously in 
most sectors and countries, each country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding or 
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contracting depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less than in other 
sectors and countries.   
 Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand for all sectors.  World 
prices increase most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most.5  This in turn causes 
changes in countries’ terms of trade that can be positive or negative.  Those countries that are net 
exporters of goods with the greatest degree of liberalization will experience increases in their 
terms of trade, as the world prices of their exports rise relative to their imports.  The reverse 
occurs for net exporters in industries where liberalization is slight – perhaps because it may 
already have taken place in previous trade rounds. 
 The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-trade 
effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional benefits 
due to the realization of economies of scale.  Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain 
from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country 
where there is a comparative advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency 
gains should raise national welfare measured by the equivalent variation for every country,6  
although some factor owners within a country may lose, as will be noted below.  However, it is 
possible for a particular country whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest 
liberalization to lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains. 
 On the other hand, although trade with imperfect competition is perhaps best known for 
introducing reasons why countries may lose from trade, actually its greatest contribution is to 
expand the list of reasons for gains from trade.  Thus, in the Michigan Model,  trade liberalization 
permits all countries to expand their export sectors at the same time that all sectors compete more 
                                                 
5 The price of agricultural products supplied by the rest of the world is taken as the  numeraire in the model, 
and there is a rest-of-world against which all other prices can rise. 
6 The equivalent variation is a measure of the amount of income that would have to be given or taken away 
from an economy before a change in policy in order to leave the economy as well off as it would be after 
the policy change has taken place.  If the equivalent variation is positive, it is indicative of an improvement 
in economic welfare resulting from the policy change. 
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closely with a larger number of competing varieties from abroad.  As a result, countries as a 
whole gain from lower costs due to increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions due to 
greater competition, and reduced costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety.  All 
of these effects make it more likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are 
shared across the entire population.7 
 The various effects just described in the context of multilateral trade liberalization will 
also take place when there is unilateral trade liberalization, although these effects will depend on 
the magnitudes of the liberalization in relation to the patterns of trade and the price and output 
responses involved between the liberalizing country and its trading partners.  Similarly, many of 
the effects described will take place with the formation of bilateral or regional FTAs.  But in these 
cases, there may be trade creation and positive effects on the economic welfare of FTA-member 
countries together with trade diversion and negative effects on the economic welfare of non-
member countries.  The net effects on economic welfare for individual countries and globally will 
thus depend on the economic circumstances and policy changes implemented.8 
In the real world, all of the various effects occur over time, some of them more quickly 
than others.  However, the Michigan Model is static in the sense that it is based upon a single set 
of equilibrium conditions rather than relationships that vary over time. 9   The model results 
                                                 
7 In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects countries as a 
whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor – the "scarce factor" – to lose through the 
mechanism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941).  The additional sources of gain from trade due 
to increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, however, are shared across factors, and we 
routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor and capital gain from multilateral trade liberalization.   
8 It may be noted that, in a model of perfect competition, bilateral trade liberalization should have the effect 
of contracting trade with the excluded countries, thereby improving the terms of trade for the FTA 
members vis-à-vis the rest of world.  But in a model with scale economies, the pro-competitive effect of 
trade liberalization can generate a cut in price and increase in supply to excluded countries.  The terms of 
trade of FTA members may therefore deteriorate in this event. 
   It should also be mentioned that rules of origin may offset some of the potential welfare benefits of FTAs 
insofar as they may lead to higher input costs and consequent reduction of FTA preference margins.  In this 
connection, see Krishna (2004). 
9 As noted above, macroeconomic closure in the model involves the equivalent of having expenditure equal 
to the sum of earned incomes plus redistributed net tax revenues.   However, the actual solution is attained 
indirectly, but equivalently, by imposing a zero change in the trade balance.  Since the model allows for all 
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therefore refer to a time horizon that depends on the assumptions made about which variables do 
and do not adjust to changing market conditions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these 
adjustments.  Because the supply and demand elasticities used in the model reflect relatively 
long-run adjustments and it is assumed that markets for both labor and capital clear within 
countries,10 the modeling results are appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several 
years – perhaps two or three at a minimum.  On the other hand, the model does not allow for the 
very long-run adjustments that could occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and 
technological change.  The modeling results should therefore be interpreted as being 
superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the economies involved.  To the extent that these 
growth paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, the model does not 
capture such effects.  
Benchmark Data 
Needless to say, the data needs of this model are immense.  Apart from numerous share 
parameters, the model requires various types of elasticity measures.  Like other CGE models, 
most of our data come from published sources.   
 As mentioned above, the main data source used in the model is "The GTAP-5.4 Database" 
of the Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis Project (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
2002).  The reference year for this GTAP database is 1997.  From this source, we have extracted 
the following data, aggregated to our sectors and countries/regions:11 
                                                                                                                                                 
net tax and tariff revenues to be redistributed to consumers, when tariffs are reduced with trade 
liberalization, the model implicitly imposes a non-distorting tax to recoup the loss in tariff revenues. 
10 The analysis in the model assumes throughout that the aggregate, economy-wide, level of employment is 
held constant in each country.  The effects of trade liberalization are therefore not permitted to change any 
country's overall rates of employment or unemployment.  This assumption is made because overall 
employment is determined by macroeconomic forces and policies that are not contained in the model and 
would not themselves be included in a negotiated trade agreement.  The focus instead is on the composition 
of employment across sectors as determined by the microeconomic interactions of supply and demand 
resulting from the liberalization of trade. 
11 Details on the sectoral and country/region aggregation are available from the authors on request. 
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• Bilateral trade flows among 22 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 sectors.  Trade with 
the rest-of-world (ROW) is included to close the model. 
• Input-output tables for the 22 countries/regions, excluding ROW 
• Components of final demand along with sectoral contributions for the 22 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW  
• Gross value of output and value added at the sectoral level for the 22 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW 
• Bilateral import tariffs by sector among the 22 countries/regions 
• Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor by sector 
• Bilateral export-tax equivalents among the 22 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 
sectors 
The monopolistically competitive market structure in the nonagricultural sectors of the 
model imposes an additional data requirement of the numbers of firms at the sectoral level, and 
there is need also for estimates of sectoral employment.12  The employment data, which have 
been adapted from a variety of published sources, will be noted in tables below. 
 The GTAP-5.4 1997 database has been projected to the year 2005, which is when the 
Uruguay Round liberalization will have been fully implemented.  In this connection, we 
extrapolated the labor availability in different countries/regions by an average weighted 
population growth rate of 1.2 percent per annum.  All other major variables have been projected, 
using an average weighted growth rate of GDP of 2.5 percent.13   The 2005 data have been 
adjusted to take into account two major developments that have occurred in the global trading 
system since the mid-1990s.  These include:  (1) implementation of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations that were completed in 1993-94 and were to be phased in over the following decade; 
                                                 
12 Notes on the construction of the data on the number of firms and for employment are available from the 
authors on request. 
13 The underlying data are drawn from World Bank sources and are available on request.  For a more 
elaborate and detailed procedure for calculating year 2005 projections, see Hertel and Martin (2000 and 
2001) and Hoekman and Martin (2001). 
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and (2) the accession of Mainland China and Taiwan to the WTO in 2001.14  We have made 
allowance for the foregoing developments by readjusting the 2005 scaled-up database for 
benchmarking purposes to obtain an approximate picture of what the world may be expected to 
look like in 2005.  In the computational scenarios to be presented below, we use these re-adjusted 
data as the starting point to carry out our liberalization scenarios for the U.S. bilateral FTAs and 
for the accompanying unilateral and global free trade scenarios. 
 The GTAP 5.4 (1997) base data for tariffs and the estimated tariff equivalents of services 
barriers are broken down by sector on a global basis and bilaterally for existing and prospective 
FTA partners of the United States and Japan in Tables 1-2.  The post-Uruguay Round tariff rates 
on agriculture, mining, and manufactures are applied rates and are calculated in GTAP by 
dividing tariff revenues by the value of imports by sector.   
The services barriers are based on financial data on average gross (price-cost) margins 
constructed initially by Hoekman (2000) and adapted for modeling purposes in Brown, Deardorff, 
and Stern (2002).  The gross operating margins are calculated as the differences between total 
revenues and total operating costs.  Some of these differences are presumably attributable to fixed 
costs.  Given that the gross operating margins vary across countries, a portion of the margin can 
also be attributed to barriers to FDI.  For this purpose, a benchmark is set for each sector in 
relation to the country with the smallest gross operating margin, on the assumption that 
operations in the benchmark country can be considered to be freely open to foreign firms.  The 
excess in any other country above this lowest benchmark is then taken to be due to barriers to 
establishment by foreign firms.   
                                                 
14 The tariff data for the WTO accession of China and Taiwan have been adapted from Ianchovichina and 
Martin (2004).  In addition to benchmarking the effects of the Uruguay Round and China/Taiwan accession 
to the WTO, Francois et al. (2003) benchmark their GTAP 5.4 dataset to take into account the enlargement 
of the European Union (EU) in 2004 to include ten new member countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
and some changes in the EU Common Agricultural Policies that were introduced in 2000.  Our EU and 
EFTA regional aggregate includes the 25-member EU, but the benchmark data were not adjusted to take 
into account the adoption of the EU common external tariffs by the new members.  Because of data 
constraints, we have not made allowance for the Information Technology Agreement and agreements for 
liberalization of financial and telecommunication services following conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
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That is, the barrier is modeled as the cost-increase attributable to an increase in fixed cost 
borne by multinational corporations attempting to establish an enterprise locally in a host country.  
This abstracts from the possibility that fixed costs may differ among firms because of variations 
in market size, distance from headquarters, and other factors.  It is further assumed that this cost 
increase can be interpreted as an ad valorem equivalent tariff on services transactions generally.  
It can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 that the constructed services barriers are considerably higher than 
the import barriers on manufactures.  While possibly subject to overstatement, it is generally 
acknowledged that many services sectors are highly regulated and thus restrain international 
services transactions. 
For the United States, the highest import tariffs for manufactures are recorded for textiles, 
wearing apparel, and leather products & footwear, both globally and bilaterally.  For Japan, the 
highest import tariffs are noted in agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, textiles, wearing 
apparel, and leather & leather products.  The values and shares of U.S. and Japanese exports and 
imports are broken down by sector according to origin and destination in Tables 3-6 on a global 
basis as well as for FTA partners.  Employment by sector is indicated for the United States and 
for Japan and their FTA partners in Table 7.   
III. Computational Analysis of U.S. Free Trade Agreements 
As already noted, both the United States and Japan had signed or were in the process of 
negotiating bilateral FTAs in 2006, at the time of writing.  For the United States, these include the 
agreements with Chile and Singapore approved by the U.S. Congress in 2003, agreements with 
Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA), Australia, and Morocco to be submitted 
for Congressional approval in 2004, and ongoing negotiations with the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU), Thailand, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).15  The Japanese 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that the FTA negotiations with the SACU and Thailand have subsequently been 
suspended, and FTAA negotiations have been placed on hold.  FTA negotiations were being concluded 
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bilateral FTAs will be analyzed below and include the agreement with Singapore signed in 2002 
and subsequent and prospective agreements with Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, 
and Thailand. 
As we note in Brown, Kiyota, and Stern (2005a,b,2007,2008), the United States has a 
myriad of objectives in pursuing FTAs, including increased market access and shaping the 
regulatory and political environment in FTA partner countries to conform to U.S. principles and 
institutions.  By the same token, the FTA partners are attracted by the preferential margins for 
U.S. market access and opportunities to improve their economic efficiency and to design and 
implement more effective domestic institutions and policies.  Similarly, Japan and its FTA 
partners are motivated by many of these objectives. 
 The U.S. FTAs to be analyzed are denoted as follows: 
  USCHFTA U.S.-Chile FTA 
  USSGFTA U.S.-Singapore FTA 
  USCAFTA U.S.-Central America FTA 
  USAUSFTA U.S.-Australia FTA 
  USMORFTA U.S.-Morocco FTA 
  USSACUFTA U.S.-Southern African Customs Union FTA 
  USTHFTA U.S.-Thailand FTA 
FTAA  Free Trade Area of the Americas 
 Our reference point is the post-Uruguay Round 2005 database together with the post-
Uruguay Round tariff rates on agricultural products and manufactures and the specially 
constructed measures of services barriers described above.  Four scenarios have been carried out 
for each FTA:  (A) removal of agricultural tariffs16; (M) removal of manufactures tariffs; (S) 
removal of services barriers; and (C) combined removal of agricultural and manufactures tariffs 
and services barriers.  Because of space constraints, we report only the results of the combined 
                                                                                                                                                 
with Bahrain in 2004.  An FTA with Peru was approved in 2009.  Negotiations have been ongoing with 
Colombia, Korea, and Panama and are yet to be submitted for Congressional approval.  See the USTR 
website for more information. 
16  The bilateral FTA scenarios in this and in the next section make no allowance for reductions in 
agricultural export subsidies and agricultural production subsidies, which are excluded from bilateral 
negotiations and fall within the scope of the multilateral negotiations. 
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removal of agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers, denoted by USCHFTA-C, 
etc.  The results for the separate removal of the agricultural, manufactures, and services barriers 
and for the sectoral effects on exports, imports, and gross output are available on request.   
 We should emphasize that our computational analysis does not take into account other 
features of the various FTAs, which do not lend themselves readily to quantification.  These other 
features cover E-commerce, intellectual property, labor and environmental standards, investment, 
government procurement, trade remedies, dispute settlement, and the development of new 
institutional and cooperative measures.  By the same token, because of data constraints, we have 
not made allowance for rules of origin and special preferences that may be negotiated as part of 
each FTA and that could be designed for protectionist reasons to limit trade. 
 USCHFTA-C: U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement – The U.S.-Chile FTA was approved 
by the U.S. Congress in 2003.  The estimated global welfare effects are indicated in Table 8.  
Global welfare increases by $7.9 billion, with U.S. welfare increasing by $6.9 billion (0.1% of 
GNP) and Chile’s welfare by $1.2 billion (1.3% of GNP).17   The sectoral results for the United 
States are shown in Table 9 and indicate relatively small employment declines in U.S. agriculture, 
food, beverages & tobacco, wearing apparel, and leather products & footwear, and employment 
increases in the other sectors.  The sectoral employment effects for Chile are indicated in Table 
10 and show employment increases in agriculture, mining, food, beverages & tobacco, leather & 
leather products, metal products, and trade and transport services, and employment declines in 
several manufacturing sectors and other services.  These employment changes for Chile suggest 
the extent of labor market adjustments that may occur as a result of the FTA. 
 USSGFTA-C:  U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement – The welfare effects of a U.S.-
Singapore FTA, which was approved by the U.S. Congress in 2003, noted in Table 8, indicate an 
increase in global welfare of $22.5 billion, with U.S. welfare rising by $15.8 billion (0.2% of 
                                                 
17 The estimated effects on aggregate exports/imports, terms of trade, and real returns to capital and labor 
for this and all other FTAs to be analyzed in what follows are available from the authors on request.  
Changes in bilateral trade flows by country/region of origin and destination are also available. 
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GNP) and Singapore’s welfare by $2.5 billion (2.6% of GNP).  In Table 9, the sectoral 
employment effects for the United States are relatively small, whereas in Table 10, for Singapore, 
there are relatively large sectoral employment increases in textiles, wearing apparel, and services, 
and declines in most other sectors.  These sectoral changes suggest sizable employment 
adjustments for Singapore that may occur in the FTA with the United States. 
 USCAFTA-C:  U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement – The U.S.-CAFTA was 
signed in December 2003 and was subsequently approved by the U.S. Congress.  The estimated 
global welfare effects are shown in Table 8.  Global welfare rises by $15.7 billion, U.S. welfare 
by $17.3 billion (0.2% of GNP) and the welfare of the aggregate of Central American and the 
Caribbean (CAC) by $5.3 (4.4% of GNP).18,19 It can also be seen that the CAFTA is apparently 
trade diverting for most of the non-member countries/regions shown. The sectoral employment 
effects for the United States, noted in Table 9, indicate that. the employment declines are 
concentrated in textiles and wearing apparel and are comparatively small as a percent of 
employment in these sectors, -0.6% and -1.8%, respectively.  The sectoral employment changes 
                                                 
18 The GTAP 5.4 data refer to a CAC aggregate and do not provide separate data for the five Central 
American countries and the Dominican Republic that comprise the CAFTA.  It is noted in Brown, Kiyota, 
and Stern (2005b) that the CAFTA countries account for a substantial proportion of CAC trade so that 
using CAC data may be a reasonable approximation for modeling purposes. 
19 Andriamananjara and Tsigas (2003) use the standard GTAP model to analyze the welfare effects of 
bilateral U.S. FTAs with 65 countries/regions.  This version of the GTAP model assumes constant returns 
to scale, perfect competition, and product differentiation by country of origin (the so-called Armington 
assumption).  The Armington assumption implies that countries have monopoly power in their trading 
relationships, and that trade liberalization may thus have sizable terms-of-trade effects, depending on the 
structure and pattern of trade.  There is reason to believe accordingly that welfare changes in this version of 
the GTAP model may reflect strong terms-of-trade effects.  This is evident in the results of a U.S.-CAC 
FTA, which is estimated to increase U.S. economic welfare by $1.6 billion (.02% of GDP) and CAC 
welfare by $2.2 billion (2.4% of GDP).  The decomposition of the results by the authors in their Appendix 
Table indicates that a substantial proportion of these welfare changes is due to changes in terms of trade.  
DeRosa and Gilbert (2004) also use the standard GTAP model to analyze U.S. bilateral FTAs with 13 
prospective partner countries, and their results similarly suggest the predominance of terms of trade effects.  
In contrast, in the Michigan Model, manufactures and services products are differentiated by firm, so that 
countries have much less leverage over their terms of trade.   
It should also be noted that, while the GTAP framework is structured to take shifts of productive resources 
into account and generates results for effects on real wages and the return to capital, the GTAP framework 
does not permit calculation of shifts in the sectoral employment of workers as is done in the Michigan 
Model. 
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for the CAC are shown in Table 10.  The increases are quite large in textiles, wearing apparel, 
and leather products & footwear, and there are employment declines in all of the other sectors, as 
the expansion of the relatively labor-intensive industries attracts workers from the rest of the 
economy.  These results thus suggest that the CAFTA may result in significant worker 
displacement in the process of adjustment brought about by elimination of the import barriers.  
USAUSFTA-C:  U.S.-Australia FTA – The U.S.-Australia FTA was signed in February 
2004 and was later approved by the U.S.  Congress.  It can be seen in Table 8 that global welfare 
rises by $23.1 billion, U.S. welfare by $19.4 billion (0.2% of GNP), and Australian welfare by 5.4 
billion (1.1% of GNP). There are many instances of trade diversion for non-partner countries. The 
sectoral effects for the United States in Table 9 and for Australia in Table 10 indicate that the 
U.S.-Australia FTA will have fairly small effects on the sectoral employment in the two 
countries. 
USMORFTA-C:  U.S.-Morocco FTA – As noted in Tables 3-4 above, U.S. trade in 
goods and services with Morocco is rather small. By far the largest proportions of Morocco’s 
trade are with the EU and EFTA.   The global welfare increase from the U.S.-Morocco FTA  
indicated in Table 8 is $7.5 billion, $6.0 billion (0.1% of GNP) for the United States, and $0.9 
billion (2.0% of GNP) for Morocco.20  The U.S. sectoral employment changes noted in Table 9 
are negligible.  For Morocco, in Table 10, the largest employment increases are in trade & 
transport, textiles, and wearing apparel, and the largest declines in agriculture, food, beverages & 
tobacco, and government services.  The welfare and employment effects of the U.S.-Morocco 
FTA are thus seen to be fairly small.  
USSACUFTA-C:  U.S.-Southern African Customs Union – The effects of a U.S.-
SACU FTA are indicated in Table 8 and indicate an increase of  $11.8 billion in global welfare, 
                                                 
20 Andriamananjara and Tsigas (2003, p. 16) estimate that the U.S.-Morocco FTA will reduce Morocco’s  
economic welfare by $108 million (-0.3% of GDP) and will increase U.S. welfare by $161 million (.002% 
of GDP). Terms-of-trade effects are again evidently dominant, and, in any event, the overall welfare effects 
are much lower than the results based on the Michigan Model. 
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$9.6 billion (0.1% of GNP) for the United States, and $2.2 billion (1.2% of GNP) for the SACU 
members combined.  In Table 9, there are indications of negligible sectoral employment impacts 
for the United States.  In Table 10, the employment increases for SACU are concentrated in 
textiles and wearing apparel and are negative across the remaining sectors as labor is attracted 
towards the labor-intensive sectors. 
US-THFTA-C:  U.S.-Thailand FTA – In Table 8, the global welfare increase for the 
U.S.-Thailand FTA is $21.9 billion, $17.1 billion (0.2% of GNP) for the United States, and $5.6 
billion (2.8% of GNP) for Thailand.  There is evidence of pervasive trade diversion.  The sectoral 
employment changes for the United States noted in Table 9 are negligible.  For Thailand, in Table 
10, the largest employment increases are concentrated in food, beverages & tobacco, textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather & leather products, other manufactures, and trade & transport, and there 
are employment declines especially in agriculture, mining, several capital-intensive manufactures,  
construction, other private services, and government services.   
 FTAA-C:  Free Trade Area of the Americas – Discussions have been ongoing for 
several years to create a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA).21  Since the country detail in 
our model does not include the individual members of the FTAA, we have chosen to approximate 
it by combining the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Chile with an aggregate of Central 
American and Caribbean (CAC) and an aggregate of other South American nations. The welfare 
effects of the FTAA are indicated in column Table 8 and amount to $109.5 billion globally, $67.6 
billion (0.7% of GNP) for the United States, $5.8 billion (0.7% of GNP) for Canada, $3.4 billion 
(3.6% of GNP) for Mexico, $3.4 billion (3.6% of GNP) for Chile, $7.8 billion (6.5% of GNP) for 
the CAC, and $27.6 billion (1.5% of GNP) for the aggregate of other South American countries.  
There is some evidence of trade diversion, in particular for Japan and the EU/EFTA.  The sectoral 
employment effects for the United States, indicated in Table 11, show relatively small 
                                                 
21 For details on the FTAA negotiations, see the website of the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative [www.ustr.gov]. 
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employment declines in agriculture, mining, food, beverages & tobacco, and other private and 
government services, and increases in all other sectors.  In Table 11, the sectoral employment 
effects for Canada are also small, whereas the employment increases for Mexico, Chile, the CAC, 
and other South America are noteworthy.  This suggests that the developing countries covered in 
the FTAA would experience more employment adjustments than the United States and Canada. 
IV. Computational Analysis of Japan’s Free Trade Agreements 
 In this section, we consider the welfare and sectoral employment effects of the Japan-
Singapore FTA that was concluded in 2002 and the FTAs in process with Chile, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand.22  These are designated as follows: 
  JSGFTA Japan-Singapore FTA 
  JCHFTA Japan-Chile FTA 
  JINDFTA Japan-Indonesia FTA 
  JKFTA Japan-Korea FTA 
  JMAFTA Japan-Malaysia FTA 
  JMXFTA Japan-Mexico FTA 
  JPHFTA Japan-Philippines FTA 
  JTHFTA Japan-Thailand FTA 
 As was the case for the U.S. FTAs analyzed in the previous section, we have undertaken 
separate computations for (A) removal of agricultural tariffs; (M) removal of manufactures 
tariffs; (S) removal of services barriers; and (C) combined removal of agricultural and 
manufactures tariffs and services barriers.  In what follows, we report only the results of the 
combined removal of agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers, denoted by 
JSGFTA-C, etc.  The results for the separate removal of the agricultural, manufactures, and 
services barriers are available on request.   
                                                 
22 It should be noted that the FTA negotiations were being concluded with Chile in 2007, Indonesia in 2008, 
Malaysia in 2006, Mexico in 2005, Philippines in 2008, and Thailand in 2007. FTA negotiations with 
Brunei, Vietnam, and Switzerland were also being concluded in 2008, 2009, and 2009, respectively. 
Negotiations have been ongoing with Korea, India, Australia, and the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council).  
See the METI and MOFA websites for more information. 
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 JSGFTA-C:  Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement – As shown in Table 12, the 
combined removal of bilateral tariffs on agricultural products and manufactures and services 
barriers would increase global economic welfare by $6.7 billion.  Japan’s welfare rises by $5.0 
billion (0.1% of GNP) and Singapore by $0.6 billion (0.7% of GNP).  A JSGFTA appears to be 
trade diverting to a small extent.  The other industrialized countries besides Japan show increases 
in welfare.23  The sectoral results, which are shown Table 13, indicate negligible shifts in Japan’s 
employment.  For Singapore, as indicated in Table 14, there are employment increases especially 
in wearing apparel, leather & leather products, and trade & transport, and declines in many other  
manufacturing sectors and  other private services.  A Japan-Singapore FTA thus appears to have 
relatively small effects on Japan’s welfare and results in sectoral employment shifts in Singapore 
away from capital-intensive towards relatively more labor-intensive sectors. 
 JCHFTA-C:  Japan-Chile Free Trade Agreement – In Table 12, a JCHFTA indicates 
increases in global welfare of $3.5 billion.  Japan’s welfare rises by $2.8 billion (0.1% of GNP), 
and Chile’s welfare rises by $0.9 billion (1.0% of GNP).  There are negative welfare effects for 
the United States, Canada, and several developing countries. The sectoral results for Japan, in 
Table 13, indicate negligible sectoral shifts. For Chile, as indicated in Table 14, there are 
employment increases in agriculture and food, beverages & tobacco and declines in mining and 
all of the manufactures and services sectors as resources are shifted away from these sectors.   
 JINDFTA-C:  Japan-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement – As indicated in Table 12, a 
JINDFTA increases global welfare by $11.1 billion, Japan’s welfare by $18.7 billion (0.2% of 
GNP), and Indonesia’s welfare by $1.7 billion (0.7% of GNP).  There are indications of trade 
diversion and negative welfare effects for most of the non-member countries/regions.  The 
                                                 
23 See Hertel, Walmsley, and Itakura (2001) for a GTAP model-based analysis of the Japan-Singapore FTA 
that takes into account the proposed bilateral tariff reductions, implementation of uniform standards for e-
commerce, services liberalization, the impact of automating customs procedures in Japan, and changes in 
foreign direct investment.  They find that customs automization plays the most important role in driving 
increases in merchandise trade.  They estimate global welfare gains of over $9 billion, most of these gains 
accruing to Japan.  They find no evidence of trade diversion. 
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sectoral results for Japan in Table 13 show small negative employment effects on Japanese 
agriculture and labor-intensive manufactures and positive effects on most other sectors.  For 
Indonesia, the sectoral employment effects mirror those in Japan, with employment expansion in 
Indonesian agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, and labor-intensive manufactures and 
employment declines in all other sectors. 
 JKFTA-C:  Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement – In Table 12, a JKFTA increases 
global welfare by $19.7 billion, Japan’s welfare by $18.7 billion (0.4% of GNP), and Korea’s 
welfare increases by $2.2 billion (0.4% of GNP).  There is some evidence of trade diversion for 
the United States, EU/EFTA, and for some developing countries.  The sectoral results, shown in 
Table 13, indicate relatively small employment declines in Japan in agriculture and labor-
intensive manufactures, and increases in employment in durable manufactures and services.  For 
Korea, as shown in Table 14, employment falls in many capital-intensive manufactures sectors 
and in services and rises in Korea’s agriculture and labor-intensive manufactures.24 
 JMAFTA-C:  Japan-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement – Global economic welfare is 
shown in Table 12 to increase by $10.1 billion, Japan’s welfare by $10.5 billion (0.2% of GNP), 
and Malaysia’s welfare by $0.3 billion (0.2% of GNP).  In Table 13, sectoral employment 
declines in Japan’s agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, labor-intensive sectors, machinery & 
equipment, and other manufactures, and there are employment increases in the other 
manufactures sectors and construction, other private services, and government services. For 
Malaysia, in Table 14, the employment increases are concentrated in agriculture, food, beverages 
& tobacco, wearing apparel, wood & wood products, and trade & transport, and there are declines 
in capital-intensive manufactures and services except for trade & transport. 
                                                 
24 See McKibbin, Lee, and Cheong (2004) for an analysis of a Japan-Korea FTA, using the Asia-Pacific G-
Cubed Model.  The G-Cubed model incorporates rational expectations and forward-looking intertemporal 
behavior of individual agents. The model takes into account the induced changes in expected rates of return 
to capital by sector and consequent structural adjustments.  Allowance is also made for short-term wage 
stickiness or adjustment costs in allocating capital.  The authors conclude that Japan and Korea gain from a 
FTA, but there is trade diversion for the United States, Australia, and other countries.  Their results also 
suggest greater benefits from a rapid liberalization rather than a more gradual phasing. 
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 JMXFTA-C:  Japan-Mexico Free Trade Agreement – As indicated in Table 12, a 
JMXFTA increases global welfare by $10.6 billion.  Japan’s welfare increases by $8.2 billion 
(0.2% of GNP) and Mexico’s welfare by $3.4 billion (0.7% of GNP).  There are indications that a 
JMXFTA would be trade diverting for the United States, Canada, EU/EFTA , and several 
developing countries.  The sectoral results for Japan, shown in Table 13, indicate relatively small 
employment declines in agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, and labor-intensive manufactures 
and increases especially in durable manufactures.  For Mexico, in Table 14, the sectoral results 
show relatively small employment increases in agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, and trade 
& transport and declines across the manufactures sectors and services.  
 JPHFTA-C:  Japan-Philippines FTA – In Table 12, global welfare increases by $3.0 
billion, Japan’s welfare by $2.2 billion (0.1% of GNP), and the Philippines welfare by $0.5 
billion (0.6% of GNP).  The sectoral employment results for Japan, noted in Table 13, indicate 
declines in agriculture and food, beverages & tobacco, and labor-intensive manufactures and 
increases in the other manufactures sectors and services.  For the Philippines, in Table 14, the 
employment shifts mirror those in Japan, with increases concentrated in agriculture, food, 
beverages & tobacco and labor-intensive manufactures and declines across other manufactures 
and services. 
 JTHFTA-C:  Japan-Thailand FTA – In Table 12, a Japan-Thailand FTA increases 
global welfare by $13.5 billion and Japan’s welfare by $19.5 billion (0.4% of GNP), and reduces 
Thailand’s welfare by $0.5 billion (-0.3% of GNP).  There are indications of trade diversion 
across most of the other countries/regions indicated.  There are sectoral employment declines in 
Japan, noted in Table 13, in agriculture, food, beverages & tobacco, and labor-intensive sectors 
and employment increases in capital-intensive manufactures and services.  For Thailand, in Table 
14, the employment increases are concentrated in agriculture and food, beverages & tobacco and 
employment declines across the manufactures and services sectors.  The reduction in Thailand’s 
welfare stems from the shifts away from the manufactures sectors, which are modeled with 
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increasing returns to scale, to the agricultural sector, which is modeled with constant returns to 
scale. 
V. Hub and Spoke Effects of the U.S. and Japan FTAs 
 In the discussion of the U.S. and Japan bilateral FTAs in the preceding sections, it was 
noted that there were indications of negative welfare effects for a number of non-member 
countries/regions.  It is well known theoretically that preferential trading arrangements may result 
in both trade creation, which is welfare enhancing, and trade diversion, which will reduce welfare 
as trade is shifted from lower to higher cost sources of supply.  But there is another consideration, 
which is that bilateral FTAs are based on the "hub-and-spoke" arrangement, with the United 
States or Japan representing the hub and with separate spokes connecting the bilateral FTA 
partners to the hub.  In negotiating these bilateral FTAs, no account is taken of the effects that 
they may have on non-members, even though there may be a bilateral FTA with one or more of 
the non-members.  As more and more bilateral FTAs are negotiated, the spokes of the FTAs may 
thus emanate out in many different and overlapping directions, with resulting distortions of global 
trade patterns.  That is, this combination of varying preferences among different and overlapping 
FTAs may lead to greatly increased transactions costs for firms and the undermining of the most-
favored-nation (MFN) principle of non-discrimination that is at the heart of the multilateral 
trading system.  These effects of the proliferation of FTAs are what Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(1996) refer to as "spaghetti-bowl" effects.  
An indication of the trade diversion associated with the U.S. and Japan FTAs and the 
overlapping of the spokes involved is shown in the top half of Table 15, which has shaded cells 
indicating cases of positive welfare effects and white cells indicating cases of negative welfare 
effects.  Altogether, 16 FTAs are shown, although there is some double counting insofar as the 
U.S.-CAC and U.S.-Chile bilateral FTAs are encompassed in the FTAA.  In any event, it seems 
evident from Table 15 that trade diversion and negative welfare effects are pervasive.  Thus, 
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while partner-FTA countries may gain directly from their FTAs, as indicated by "X" in the table, 
they may be adversely affected by other FTAs that have been negotiated.   
The global results of the bilateral FTAs in Tables 8 and 12 above for the United States 
and Japan suggest that the negative welfare effects on non-members may be rather small in both 
absolute terms and as a percent of GNP.  But, as mentioned in our earlier discussion, because of 
data limitations, our results do not reflect the potential welfare declines due to rules of origin and 
other discriminatory arrangements built into the bilateral FTAs.  On the other hand, we do not 
allow for increased inflows of foreign direct investment into the partner countries or the effects of 
improvements in productivity and increased capital formation.  Unfortunately, we are not in a 
position to assess these potential benefits.  But it seems clear from our computational results that 
the welfare increases from the FTA removal of trade barriers are fairly small on the whole. 
Pending further analysis, we therefore conclude that there is reason to be concerned about the 
trade diversion and overlapping spoke effects of bilateral FTAs.   
VI. Welfare Effects of Unilateral Free Trade and Global Free Trade 
 In this section, we ask how the welfare of the United States, Japan, their FTA partners, 
and other countries/regions in the global trading system would be affected if it were feasible to 
adopt unilateral free trade or global free trade on a non-discriminatory (MFN) basis. as compared 
to the adoption of discriminatory bilateral FTAs. The results are indicated in Table 16.  Unilateral 
free trade adopted by the United States would increase U.S. welfare by $320.2 billion (3.2% of 
GNP), which is about three times greater than the U.S. welfare gains from the bilateral FTAs 
combined.  If there were global (multilateral) free trade, U.S. welfare would be increased by 
$401.8 billion (5.4% of GNP).  Japan’s welfare would increase with unilateral free trade by 
$200.3 billion (3.7% of GNP) and with global free trade by $542.5 billion (7.4% of GNP), as 
compared to the $66.9 billion to be gained from Japan’s bilateral FTAs combined.  There are also 
clear indications that the FTA partner countries would generally gain more from the adoption of 
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unilateral free trade by the United States and Japan as compared to the partner-country gains from 
their bilateral FTAs.  Furthermore, the FTA partner countries would generally gain even more if 
they adopted unilateral free trade and especially if there were global free trade.25   
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to 
calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of U.S.-Japan trade 
policies.  The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential U.S. and Japan bilateral and 
regional FTAs negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers by the 
United States, Japan, and the FTA partner countries, and global (multilateral) free trade.  The 
welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States and Japan have been shown to be rather small 
in absolute and relative terms.  The sectoral employment effects are also generally small for both 
countries, but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of bilateral 
liberalization. 
 The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are shown to be mostly positive though 
generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in 
some partner countries. The results further suggest that there would be trade diversion and 
detrimental welfare effects in some non-member countries/regions.  It also appears that, while 
                                                 
25 In commenting on an earlier version of our paper, Juan Carlos Hallak asked why there are larger absolute 
welfare gains and smaller percent changes in welfare for the large countries as compared to the small 
countries in our computational results.  In this connection, the expectation is that, under conditions of 
perfect competition, a small country may appropriate a large share of the absolute gains from trade 
liberalization because the prices of the small country will tend to move towards the prices in the large 
country.  Since large price changes give rise to large gains from trade, the small country may be expected 
therefore to realize greater gains from liberalization than the large country. 
    But when scale effects are present, as in the Michigan Model, the foregoing distributional logic may not 
hold.  That is, scale gains will be substantial for countries that specialize in sectors with significant 
unrealized scale economies, and it may well be that large countries are in a better position to realize big 
scale gains.  Also, the pro-competitive effects resulting from liberalization may produce efficiency gains 
throughout an industry. As a consequence, the absolute gain will be proportional to the industry’s/country’s 
size.  With regard to percent changes, however, there is reason to believe that a large country will exert 
stronger pro-competitive forces on a small country, than vice versa.  We might therefore expect to observe 
larger percent changes in scale in small as compared to large countries. This is borne out in our calculations 
of scale effects for the countries/regions in the various liberalization scenarios that we have run, the results 
of which are available on request. 
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FTA partners may gain from the bilateral FTAs, they may be adversely affected because of 
overlapping "hub-and-spoke" arrangements due to other discriminatory FTAs that have been 
negotiated.  
 The welfare gains from both unilateral trade liberalization by the United States and Japan 
and from global (multilateral) trade liberalization are shown to be rather substantial and more 
uniformly positive for all countries/regions in the global trading system as compared to the 
welfare gains from the bilateral FTAs analyzed.26  The issue then is whether and when the WTO 
member countries will be able to overcome their divisiveness and indecisions and put the 
multilateral negotiations back on track.  The menu choice appears to be clear. 
                                                 
26 See the appendix below for sensitivity analysis of introducing alternative parameters in the model and the 




This appendix reports on sensitivity analysis of the Michigan Model.  There are three key 
elasticities/parameters in the Model:  the elasticity of substitution among varieties, which is 
exogenously set at three; the parameter that measures the sensitivity that consumers have to the 
number of varieties, which is set at 0.5; and the elasticities of supply that are taken from the 
literature. 
 
The variety parameter can take on values between zero and one.  The larger it is, it means 
that consumers value variety more. If the parameter is set at zero, consumers have no preference 
for variety.  This would correspond to the Armington assumption, according to which consumers 
view products depending on their place of production..  
 
To analyze the sensitivity of our model results, we have experimented with different 
values of the elasticity of substitution among varieties and the consumer sensitivity to the number 
of varieties.  The following tests were conducted:  (1) increase the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; (2) decrease the elasticity of 
substitution by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; (3) increase the consumption 
varieties parameter by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; and (4) decrease the 
consumption varieties by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant. 
 
The results, which are available on request, are not very sensitive to the alternative 
parameters of the consumption varieties. That is, a 10 percent increase (decrease) in these 
parameters yields only 2 percent larger (smaller) welfare effects compared to the baseline model. 
The sensitivity to the changes in the elasticity of substitution is large compared with the results of 
differences in the variety parameters.  For some countries, the differences are greater than 10 
percent  
 
In Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2000), sensitivity tests reveal that the model may 
exaggerate the likely gains from economies of scale due to trade liberalization in the context of 
expansion of the NAFTA. But the error is small in this context because the impact of trade 
liberalization is small.  When econometric estimates of scale economies are incorporated into the 




          (Percent)           
Global Singapore Australia Morocco SACU Thailand FTAA 
  
            Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 2.7  0.1  4.0  0.1  1.3  0.3  0.0  1.0  0.8  0.0  3.2  
Mining 0.2  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 3.5  1.2  3.4  2.8  2.8  1.4  0.0  3.0  1.3  0.0  1.8  
Textiles 5.7  9.3  6.5  7.1  6.3  8.7  0.0  6.8  14.0  0.0  7.7  
Wearing Apparel 11.0  15.5  9.7  10.5  12.4  14.2  0.0  11.6 11.5  0.0  13.6  
Leather Products & 
Footwear 7.2  5.6  4.1  3.6  2.3  7.7  0.0  4.6  7.7  0.0  6.3  
Wood & Wood Products 0.3  0.4  0.8  0.7  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.0  0.4  
Chemicals 1.9  3.2  1.0  1.0  0.7  1.8  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.9  
Non-metallic Min. Products 3.2  4.0  2.9  0.9  0.0  2.8  0.0  3.8  0.6  0.0  2.3  
Metal Products 1.4  2.3  0.2  1.4  0.6  0.9  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.6  
Transportation Equipment 1.2  1.0  1.5  0.3  1.7  0.1  0.0  1.3  1.4  0.0  0.2  
Machinery & Equipment 1.0  0.8  1.6  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.4  
Other Manufactures 1.3  1.3  0.9  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.0  2.2  0.1  0.0  1.5  
Elec., Gas & Water 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Construction 9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0  0.0  9.0  9.0  0.0  9.0  
Trade & Transport 27.0  27.0  27.0  27.0  27.0  27.0  0.0  27.0 27.0  0.0  27.0  
Other Private Services 31.0  31.0  31.0  31.0  31.0  31.0  0.0  31.0 31.0  0.0  31.0  
Government Services 25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0  25.0 25.0  0.0  25.0  
Note: Central America and Caribbean (CAC) members include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua, and are to be included in the FTAA. 
Sources: Adapted from Francois and Strutt (1999); Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002); and Diamaranan and McDougall (2002). 
Table 2.  Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Rates by Sector for Japan 
        (Percent)           
  Global Singapore Chile Korea Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Philippines Thailand 
Agriculture 38.1  1.3  2.9  5.3  6.7  0.3  6.1  11.5  1.7  
Mining -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.7  -0.6  -1.7  0.0  -1.8  
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 25.2  20.8  4.3  18.9  3.2  2.2  44.2  4.6  17.3  
Textiles 2.8  7.4  0.0  2.9  1.1  0.2  0.1  1.7  1.5  
Wearing Apparel 6.5  5.8  7.0  5.8  5.4  5.7  5.1  4.9  4.9  
Leather Products & Footwear 8.9  6.1  0.0  8.4  4.5  9.1  10.3  8.0  8.4  
Wood & Wood Products 0.4  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  
Chemicals 1.8  0.9  0.0  0.9  1.1  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.6  
Non-metallic Min. Products 1.0  0.2  0.0  0.7  1.4  0.4  0.9  0.6  1.4  
Metal Products 0.5  0.3  0.1  1.0  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.4  
Transportation Equipment 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Machinery & Equipment 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  
Other Manufactures 0.7  0.0  1.8  0.3  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.1  
Elec., Gas & Water 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Construction 3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  0.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  
Trade & Transport 15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  
Other Private Services 12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  
Government Services 28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  28.0  
Sources: Adapted from Francois and Strutt (1999); Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002); and Diamaranan and McDougall (2002). 
   
Table 3.  Value of U.S. Sectoral Exports by Destination and Origin, 1997 (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
                        
Global Singapore Australia Morocco SACU Thailand FTAA 
Value 
            Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 35,176  121  109  128  65  394  2,815  1,098  47  3,242  1,547  
Mining 6,421  15  22  6  38  6  1,416  26  39  214  434  
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 30,541  293  281  75  145  171  3,964  1,464  83  2,065  982  
Textiles 11,485  113  159  11  36  56  2,538  1,362  90  2,055  565  
Wearing Apparel 6,847  45  35  4  8  12  423  2,428  21  1,623  213  
Leather Products & Footwear 2,280  24  24  0  16  37  185  213  6  323  59  
Wood & Wood Products 29,386  284  542  8  165  182  7,717  1,094  151  3,415  1,371  
Chemicals 90,569  3,236  2,129  26  524  1,109  15,886  2,737  665  10,405  6,752  
Non-metallic Min. Products 11,921  168  318  20  96  68  2,703  269  93  922  745  
Metal Products 34,238  511  312  1  97  384  10,460  712  223  5,089  1,447  
Transportation Equipment 102,640  1,899  1,800  89  349  1,337  33,595  953  607  8,130  3,713  
Machinery & Equipment 269,892  11,075  5,440  77  1,367  3,455  44,683  3,795  1,860  27,568  17,262  
Other Manufactures 11,322  254  210  2  55  49  1,400  273  69  794  526  
Elec., Gas & Water 751  19  4  0  2  4  113  2  2  9  60  
Construction 4,023  2  3  0  4  32  5  32  0  2  9  
Trade & Transport 81,445  879  1,675  60  549  602  2,401  514  308  744  3,069  
Other Private Services 81,707  1,280  1,047  66  315  975  3,889  588  151  928  2,195  
Government Services 42,165  366  574  321  250  309  826  282  139  722  1,759  
Total 852,808  20,583  14,686  894  4,080  9,183  135,019  17,843  4,554  68,250  42,708  
 
   
Global Singapore Australia Morocco SACU Thailand FTAA 
Percent 
            Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 100.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.1 8.0 3.1 0.1 9.2 4.4 
Mining 100.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 22.0 0.4 0.6 3.3 6.8 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 100.0 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.6 13.0 4.8 0.3 6.8 3.2 
Textiles 100.0 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 22.1 11.9 0.8 17.9 4.9 
Wearing Apparel 100.0 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 6.2 35.5 0.3 23.7 3.1 
Leather Products & Footwear 100.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.6 8.1 9.3 0.3 14.2 2.6 
Wood & Wood Products 100.0 1.0 1.8 0.0 0.6 0.6 26.3 3.7 0.5 11.6 4.7 
Chemicals 100.0 3.6 2.4 0.0 0.6 1.2 17.5 3.0 0.7 11.5 7.5 
Non-metallic Min. Products 100.0 1.4 2.7 0.2 0.8 0.6 22.7 2.3 0.8 7.7 6.3 
Metal Products 100.0 1.5 0.9 0.0 0.3 1.1 30.6 2.1 0.7 14.9 4.2 
Transportation Equipment 100.0 1.9 1.8 0.1 0.3 1.3 32.7 0.9 0.6 7.9 3.6 
Machinery & Equipment 100.0 4.1 2.0 0.0 0.5 1.3 16.6 1.4 0.7 10.2 6.4 
Other Manufactures 100.0 2.2 1.9 0.0 0.5 0.4 12.4 2.4 0.6 7.0 4.6 
Elec., Gas & Water 100.0 2.5 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.5 15.1 0.3 0.2 1.3 8.0 
Construction 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Trade & Transport 100.0 1.1 2.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 2.9 0.6 0.4 0.9 3.8 
Other Private Services 100.0 1.6 1.3 0.1 0.4 1.2 4.8 0.7 0.2 1.1 2.7 
Government Services 100.0 0.9 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.7 2.0 0.7 0.3 1.7 4.2 
Total 100.0 2.4 1.7 0.1 0.5 1.1 15.8 2.1 0.5 8.0 5.0 
Source: GTAP 5.4 adapted from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
   
Table 4.  Value of U.S. Sectoral Imports by Destination and Origin, 1997 (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
                        
Global Singapore Australia Morocco SACU Thailand FTAA 
Value 
            Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 18,602 41 181 15 53  207 3,984 2,280 716 2,956 3,585  
Mining 69,939 0 413 72 133  13 17,060 664 74 8,324 12,894  
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 28,813 115 898 41 138  1,672 5,553 1,421 534 1,957 2,427  
Textiles 21,514 132 169 4 101  389 1,803 1,725 9 2,640 365  
Wearing Apparel 38,335 186 45 62 139  1,212 1,050 5,443 17 3,974 612  
Leather Products & Footwear 21,842 9 28 5 25  782 219 438 5 607 1,572  
Wood & Wood Products 43,785 211 85 4 81  353 25,258 165 352 2,956 1,216  
Chemicals 77,142 864 302 11 259  702 15,449 879 159 2,747 4,414  
Non-metallic Min. Products 14,071 17 40 2 44  161 2,572 369 18 1,365 607  
Metal Products 56,001 83 998 5 1,417  276 15,648 429 573 4,180 3,592  
Transportation Equipment 128,874 169 613 0 69  90 43,993 21 3 14,064 1,314  
Machinery & Equipment 307,001 17,834 549 94 117  6,053 32,119 1,128 13 38,411 1,726  
Other Manufactures 39,851 38 80 3 219  962 988 289 7 1,400 491  
Elec., Gas & Water 2,230 2 2 1 22  2 1,445 5 0 2 117  
Construction 1,268 3 3 2 3  3 4 18 0 2 7  
Trade & Transport 75,050 919 2,084 163 578  1,381 1,696 873 296 1,270 1,522  
Other Private Services 59,724 1,996 1,034 77 216  642 2,111 522 94 741 1,096  
Government Services 18,838 125 501 222 158  115 466 335 54 144 699  
Total 1,022,879 22,743 8,025 782 3,771  15,017 171,418 17,004 2,924 87,739 38,256  
   
Global Singapore Australia Morocco SACU Thailand FTAA 
Percent 
            Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 100.0 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.3 1.1 21.4 12.3 3.9 15.9 19.3 
Mining 100.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0 24.4 0.9 0.1 11.9 18.4 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 100.0 0.4 3.1 0.1 0.5 5.8 19.3 4.9 1.9 6.8 8.4 
Textiles 100.0 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.5 1.8 8.4 8.0 0.0 12.3 1.7 
Wearing Apparel 100.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.4 3.2 2.7 14.2 0.0 10.4 1.6 
Leather Products & Footwear 100.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 3.6 1.0 2.0 0.0 2.8 7.2 
Wood & Wood Products 100.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.8 57.7 0.4 0.8 6.8 2.8 
Chemicals 100.0 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.9 20.0 1.1 0.2 3.6 5.7 
Non-metallic Min. Products 100.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.1 18.3 2.6 0.1 9.7 4.3 
Metal Products 100.0 0.1 1.8 0.0 2.5 0.5 27.9 0.8 1.0 7.5 6.4 
Transportation Equipment 100.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 34.1 0.0 0.0 10.9 1.0 
Machinery & Equipment 100.0 5.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.5 0.4 0.0 12.5 0.6 
Other Manufactures 100.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 2.4 2.5 0.7 0.0 3.5 1.2 
Elec., Gas & Water 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 64.8 0.2 0.0 0.1 5.2 
Construction 100.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.5 
Trade & Transport 100.0 1.2 2.8 0.2 0.8 1.8 2.3 1.2 0.4 1.7 2.0 
Other Private Services 100.0 3.3 1.7 0.1 0.4 1.1 3.5 0.9 0.2 1.2 1.8 
Government Services 100.0 0.7 2.7 1.2 0.8 0.6 2.5 1.8 0.3 0.8 3.7 
Total 100.0 2.2 0.8 0.1 0.4 1.5 16.8 1.7 0.3 8.6 3.7 
Source: GTAP 5.4 adapted from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
   
Table 5.  Value of Japan's Sectoral Exports by Destination and Origin, 1997 (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Value Global Singapore Chile Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico Phlippines Thailand 
Agriculture 493 13 1 8 49 4 3 5 14 
Mining 188 2 0 13 25 7 4 3 7 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 2,803 131 3 25 200 41 6 57 118 
Textiles 7,581 177 2 245 543 130 22 126 186 
Wearing Apparel 1,054 14 1 4 50 5 5 4 7 
Leather Products & Footwear 315 9 0 4 36 2 1 10 12 
Wood & Wood Products 3,356 146 10 97 218 157 19 55 111 
Chemicals 42,360 1,851 87 1,239 4,105 1,117 283 640 1,542 
Non-metallic Min. Products 6,763 434 4 140 896 320 51 215 325 
Metal Products 29,106 1,638 26 1,206 3,307 1,817 296 498 2,063 
Transportation Equipment 92,470 1,834 390 1,961 730 1,702 666 1,156 2,001 
Machinery & Equipment 233,236 14,234 560 4,865 15,742 9,136 2,338 6,335 8,211 
Other Manufactures 7,648 228 9 74 342 161 40 34 116 
Elec., Gas & Water 78 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Construction 6,658 1 0 1 2 1 1 147 74 
Trade & Transport 33,227 356 131 171 1,045 189 287 98 205 
Other Private Services 18,131 219 27 142 249 126 364 40 163 
Government Services 4,999 42 9 26 57 20 46 14 28 
Total 490,466 21,329 1,260 10,219 27,597 14,936 4,430 9,438 15,184 
   
Percent Global Singapore Chile Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico Phlippines Thailand 
Agriculture 100.0 2.7 0.1 1.6 10.0 0.9 0.5 1.0 2.7 
Mining 100.0 1.0 0.2 6.9 13.1 3.8 2.1 1.5 3.5 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 100.0 4.7 0.1 0.9 7.1 1.5 0.2 2.0 4.2 
Textiles 100.0 2.3 0.0 3.2 7.2 1.7 0.3 1.7 2.5 
Wearing Apparel 100.0 1.3 0.1 0.4 4.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 
Leather Products & Footwear 100.0 2.7 0.1 1.4 11.5 0.6 0.2 3.1 3.9 
Wood & Wood Products 100.0 4.3 0.3 2.9 6.5 4.7 0.6 1.7 3.3 
Chemicals 100.0 4.4 0.2 2.9 9.7 2.6 0.7 1.5 3.6 
Non-metallic Min. Products 100.0 6.4 0.1 2.1 13.3 4.7 0.8 3.2 4.8 
Metal Products 100.0 5.6 0.1 4.1 11.4 6.2 1.0 1.7 7.1 
Transportation Equipment 100.0 2.0 0.4 2.1 0.8 1.8 0.7 1.3 2.2 
Machinery & Equipment 100.0 6.1 0.2 2.1 6.7 3.9 1.0 2.7 3.5 
Other Manufactures 100.0 3.0 0.1 1.0 4.5 2.1 0.5 0.4 1.5 
Elec., Gas & Water 100.0 1.5 0.2 0.6 1.7 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.9 
Construction 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.1 
Trade & Transport 100.0 1.1 0.4 0.5 3.1 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 
Other Private Services 100.0 1.2 0.1 0.8 1.4 0.7 2.0 0.2 0.9 
Government Services 100.0 0.8 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.6 
Total 100.0 4.3 0.3 2.1 5.6 3.0 0.9 1.9 3.1 
Source: GTAP 5.4 adapted from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
   
Table 6.  Value of Japan's Sectoral Imports by Destination and Origin, 1997 (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Value Global Singapore Chile Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico Phlippines Thailand 
Agriculture 21,409 84 104 332 470 514 149 299 206 
Mining 50,163 3 1,074 5,304 33 1,498 466 314 8 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 31,690 166 797 1,012 1,321 387 209 257 2,161 
Textiles 10,216 11 3 412 792 172 19 33 261 
Wearing Apparel 12,503 24 3 239 497 79 14 122 295 
Leather Products & Footwear 5,835 17 1 214 401 3 9 22 78 
Wood & Wood Products 19,128 121 445 2,503 188 1,386 12 137 530 
Chemicals 35,097 872 40 650 2,897 634 134 146 1,005 
Non-metallic Min. Products 5,436 43 2 58 289 101 38 36 236 
Metal Products 21,098 193 465 576 2,430 285 67 157 408 
Transportation Equipment 17,723 22 0 71 155 50 17 77 99 
Machinery & Equipment 78,030 5,413 1 944 5,064 4,049 197 2,755 3,906 
Other Manufactures 9,686 35 0 102 359 94 37 88 403 
Elec., Gas & Water 732 2 0 6 1 2 4 1 1 
Construction 6,918 2 0 1 2 1 1 6 10 
Trade & Transport 51,819 814 180 819 559 602 1,149 296 1,048 
Other Private Services 30,411 392 40 82 322 104 242 22 115 
Government Services 10,323 62 5 35 145 23 41 15 33 
Total 418,217 8,275 3,161 13,358 15,926 9,985 2,807 4,782 10,805 
   
Percent Global Singapore Chile Indonesia Korea Malaysia Mexico Phlippines Thailand 
Agriculture 100.0 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.2 2.4 0.7 1.4 1.0 
Mining 100.0 0.0 2.1 10.6 0.1 3.0 0.9 0.6 0.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 100.0 0.5 2.5 3.2 4.2 1.2 0.7 0.8 6.8 
Textiles 100.0 0.1 0.0 4.0 7.8 1.7 0.2 0.3 2.6 
Wearing Apparel 100.0 0.2 0.0 1.9 4.0 0.6 0.1 1.0 2.4 
Leather Products & Footwear 100.0 0.3 0.0 3.7 6.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.3 
Wood & Wood Products 100.0 0.6 2.3 13.1 1.0 7.2 0.1 0.7 2.8 
Chemicals 100.0 2.5 0.1 1.9 8.3 1.8 0.4 0.4 2.9 
Non-metallic Min. Products 100.0 0.8 0.0 1.1 5.3 1.9 0.7 0.7 4.3 
Metal Products 100.0 0.9 2.2 2.7 11.5 1.3 0.3 0.7 1.9 
Transportation Equipment 100.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 
Machinery & Equipment 100.0 6.9 0.0 1.2 6.5 5.2 0.3 3.5 5.0 
Other Manufactures 100.0 0.4 0.0 1.1 3.7 1.0 0.4 0.9 4.2 
Elec., Gas & Water 100.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.2 
Construction 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Trade & Transport 100.0 1.6 0.3 1.6 1.1 1.2 2.2 0.6 2.0 
Other Private Services 100.0 1.3 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.4 
Government Services 100.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 
Total 100.0 2.0 0.8 3.2 3.8 2.4 0.7 1.1 2.6 
Source: GTAP 5.4 adapted from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
Table 7.  Employment by Sector, 1997: United States, Japan and FTA Partners 
  (Number of Workers and Percent of Employment)                       
  United 
States Japan Korea Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Phlippines Thailand Australia Morocco SACU 
    FTAA     
Workers (thousand) 
Chile Canada CAC Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 3,538  3,518  2,385  5  35,850  1,481  11,262  16,696  431  552  4,686  776  1,058  4,074  9,023  18,636  
Mining 634  70  26  1  897  39  124  47  75  93  308  88  365  97  108  1,021  
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 2,145  1,789  317  17  2,149  153  609  622  208  568  201  277  544  725  1,556  3,657  
Textiles 949  630  384  2  1,683  67  190  710  41  383  68  46  143  179  495  1,119  
Wearing Apparel 797  460  260  9  1,050  92  459  1,241  45  653  117  40  160  513  162  1,104  
Leather Products & Footwear 111  106  96  1  875  7  65  80  13  84  30  28  32  64  172  456  
Wood & Wood Products 2,218  1,725  363  36  1,938  352  274  234  215  158  201  134  902  207  586  1,587  
Chemicals 2,667  1,431  490  45  1,295  254  286  276  113  264  162  121  462  261  1,042  2,172  
Non-metallic Min. Products 690  592  187  8  502  93  106  208  48  220  73  35  116  88  325  887  
Metal Products 3,054  1,760  489  42  570  152  175  363  189  140  202  107  553  118  493  1,336  
Transportation Equipment 2,244  1,292  543  41  354  83  75  135  97  66  84  26  534  28  583  523  
Machinery & Equipment 5,441  4,425  1,276  209  607  718  434  305  151  113  175  44  719  123  790  859  
Other Manufactures 519  287  78  4  193  31  80  119  16  3  24  4  69  34  62  169  
Elec., Gas & Water 1,493  362  77  12  233  51  139  178  66  97  131  31  256  138  188  213  
Construction 8,302  6,886  2,004  126  4,200  793  1,641  2,021  580  959  1,362  489  1,478  982  1,759  6,974  
Trade & Transport 34,466  18,968  6,967  609  21,360  2,001  5,989  5,583  2,674  2,757  3,024  1,377  8,541  3,800  9,550  23,466  
Other Private Services 14,768  5,780  1,900  274  657  447  680  882  1,197  244  1,354  377  3,906  405  1,513  3,661  
Government Services 45,521  15,500  3,265  389  12,637  1,755  5,297  3,461  2,229  3,319  6,304  1,382  8,043  3,925  8,951  35,062  
Total 129,557  65,580  21,106  1,831  87,050  8,569  27,888  33,162  8,387  10,675  18,508  5,380  27,880  15,761  37,360  102,901  
   
  United 
States Japan Korea Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Phlippines Thailand Australia Morocco SACU 
    FTAA     
Percent 
Chile Canada CAC Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture 2.7 5.4 11.3 0.3 41.2 17.3 40.4 50.3 5.1 5.2 25.3 14.4 3.8 25.8 24.2 18.1 
Mining 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.9 1.7 1.6 1.3 0.6 0.3 1.0 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 1.7 2.7 1.5 0.9 2.5 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.5 5.3 1.1 5.2 2.0 4.6 4.2 3.6 
Textiles 0.7 1.0 1.8 0.1 1.9 0.8 0.7 2.1 0.5 3.6 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.1 
Wearing Apparel 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.6 3.7 0.5 6.1 0.6 0.7 0.6 3.3 0.4 1.1 
Leather Products & 
Footwear 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Wood & Wood Products 1.7 2.6 1.7 1.9 2.2 4.1 1.0 0.7 2.6 1.5 1.1 2.5 3.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 
Chemicals 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 1.5 3.0 1.0 0.8 1.3 2.5 0.9 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.8 2.1 
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 2.1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 
Metal Products 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.3 0.7 1.8 0.6 1.1 2.3 1.3 1.1 2.0 2.0 0.7 1.3 1.3 
Transportation Equipment 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.2 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.2 1.6 0.5 
Machinery & Equipment 4.2 6.7 6.0 11.4 0.7 8.4 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 2.6 0.8 2.1 0.8 
Other Manufactures 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Elec., Gas & Water 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 
Construction 6.4 10.5 9.5 6.9 4.8 9.3 5.9 6.1 6.9 9.0 7.4 9.1 5.3 6.2 4.7 6.8 
Trade & Transport 26.6 28.9 33.0 33.3 24.5 23.4 21.5 16.8 31.9 25.8 16.3 25.6 30.6 24.1 25.6 22.8 
Other Private Services 11.4 8.8 9.0 15.0 0.8 5.2 2.4 2.7 14.3 2.3 7.3 7.0 14.0 2.6 4.1 3.6 
Government Services 35.1 23.6 15.5 21.3 14.5 20.5 19.0 10.4 26.6 31.1 34.1 25.7 28.8 24.9 24.0 34.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: ILO webiste (2003); Taiwan government website (2003); UNIDO (2003); and World Bank (2003). 
Table 8.  Global Welfare Effects of Bilateral Negotiating Options for the United States 
  
(Billions of Dollars and Percent of 
GNP)           












Japan 0.0 1.0 -1.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -1.6 
United States 6.9 15.8 17.3 19.4 6.0 9.6 17.1 67.6 
Canada 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 
Australia -0.0 0.1 -0.1 5.4 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
New Zealand -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
EU and EFTA -0.2 2.3 -3.4 -0.4 0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -6.2 
Hong Kong 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
China -0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.4 
Korea -0.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.4 
Singapore 0.0 2.5 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
Taiwan 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
Indonesia 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 
Malaysia 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 
Philippines 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
Thailand 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 5.6 -0.0 
Rest of Asia 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
Chile 1.2 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 3.4 
Mexico -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 6.6 
Central America and the Carribean (CAC) 0.0 0.0 5.3 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 7.8 
South America -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.6 
Morocco 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.9 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 -0.0 -0.1 












Japan 0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
United States 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.7  
Canada 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  
Australia 0.0  0.0  -0.0  1.1  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
New Zealand 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  
EU and EFTA 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.1  
Hong Kong 0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
China 0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Korea -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.1  
Singapore 0.0  2.6  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Taiwan 0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.1  
Indonesia 0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.1  
Malaysia 0.0  0.1  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  
Philippines 0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Thailand 0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  -0.0  
Rest of Asia 0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Chile 1.3  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  3.6  
Mexico 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  
Central America and the Carribean (CAC) 0.0  0.0  4.4  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  6.5  
South America -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  
Morocco 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) -0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  -0.0  -0.0  
   
Table 9.  Sectoral Employment Effects of Bilateral Negotiating Options for the United States  
  
(Number of Workers and Percent of 
Employment)       











Agriculture (1,427) 1,335 2,173 94  1,314 973 2,458 
Mining (58) 358 596 504  (44) 27 129 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco (548) 52 495 (756) 542 353 (1,077)
Textiles 73 (102) (5,133) 810  (32) (109) (1,230)
Wearing Apparel (118) (227) (14,006) 619  (129) (211) (2,530)
Leather products & Footwear (28) 112 1,512 207  (8) 202 (395)
Wood & Wood Products (16) 143 1,761 394  (10) 163 41 
Chemicals 355 617 2,667 1,555  (55) 127 1,384 
Non-metallic Min. Products 86 210 666 539  29 76 62 
Metal Products 87 1,358 2,218 1,957  (138) 33 1,175 
Transportation Equipment 321 959 1,069 1,741  (50) 369 351 
Machinery & Equipment 1,769 5,309 3,626 6,229  (367) 1,230 2,054 
Other Manufactures 48 526 1,558 653  (52) 77 (784)
Elec., Gas & Water (30) (56) 156 15  2 13 (10)
Construction (5) (519) 31 (257) (57) (13) 16 
Trade & Transport (849) (4,192) 640 (11,719) (1,140) (2,101) (4,272)
Other Private Services (42) (4,255) 1,362 (2,188) (194) 11 932 













Agriculture -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.1 
Mining -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1  -0.0 0.0 0.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0  0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Textiles 0.0 -0.0 -0.6 0.1  0.0 -0.0 -0.1 
Wearing Apparel -0.0 -0.0 -1.8 0.1  -0.0 -0.0 -0.3 
Leather products & Footwear -0.0 0.1 1.5 0.2  -0.0 0.2 -0.4 
Wood & Wood Products 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chemicals 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.1 
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Metal Products 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Transportation Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Machinery & Equipment 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1  -0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Manufactures 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1  -0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Elec., Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Trade & Transport 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
Other Private Services 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Government Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
   
Table 10.  Sectoral Employment Effects for the US FTA Partner Countries 
  
(Number of Workers and Percent of 
Employment)       











Agriculture 9,652 (27) (23,731) (300) (3,124) (6,495) (70,515)
Mining 811 (20) (12,650) (1,390) 992 (961) (1,468)
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1,852 29 (14,061) 564 (9,562) (820) 3,294 
Textiles (255) 115 53,741 (244) 5,431 799 23,608 
Wearing Apparel (90) 1,476 230,663 (145) 8,580 14,668 62,579 
Leather products & Footwear 31 (7) 9,518 (121) (376) (145) 6,806 
Wood & Wood Products (118) (396) (18,415) (648) 236 (801) (1,692)
Chemicals (1,677) (1,123) (19,202) (1,612) 534 (427) (6,524)
Non-metallic Min. Products (273) (105) (6,720) (437) (995) (224) (1,545)
Metal Products 997 (1,178) (11,865) (2,912) 889 (999) (5,548)
Transportation Equipment (747) (410) (2,310) (1,196) (353) (694) (1,324)
Machinery & Equipment (2,171) (6,944) (12,126) (3,490) 963 (2,068) 1,106 
Other Manufactures (81) (64) (2,361) (390) 2 (236) 2,025 
Elec., Gas & Water 64 34 (518) (67) 113 (261) 116 
Construction (528) 251 (13,873) (599) (1,097) (1,185) (2,983)
Trade & Transport 732 4,673 (71,515) 11,593 13,729 1,046 29,809 
Other Private Services (38) 4,283 (11,273) 3,160 207 (1,233) (5,628)













Agriculture 1.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 
Mining 1.0 -3.1 -13.6 -1.9 1.1 -0.3 -3.3 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.6 0.2 -1.9 0.3 -1.7 -0.4 0.5 
Textiles -0.6 5.8 27.9 -0.6 1.3 1.2 3.5 
Wearing Apparel -0.2 15.8 42.2 -0.4 1.2 12.8 5.2 
Leather products & Footwear 0.1 -0.5 14.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 8.7 
Wood & Wood Products -0.1 -1.1 -9.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.8 
Chemicals -1.4 -2.4 -7.3 -1.4 0.2 -0.3 -2.5 
Non-metallic Min. Products -0.8 -1.3 -7.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 
Metal Products 1.0 -2.8 -10.2 -1.5 0.7 -0.5 -1.7 
Transportation Equipment -2.9 -1.0 -8.5 -1.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 
Machinery & Equipment -5.1 -3.4 -10.0 -2.3 0.9 -1.2 0.4 
Other Manufactures -2.3 -1.6 -6.9 -2.4 0.1 -1.0 1.8 
Elec., Gas & Water 0.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Construction -0.1 0.2 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Trade & Transport 0.1 0.8 -1.9 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.6 
Other Private Services -0.0 1.6 -2.8 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 
Government Services -0.6 -0.2 -1.9 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -1.0 
   
Table 11.  Sectoral Employment Effects for the FTAA Member Countries 
  
(Number of Workers and Percent of 
Employment)     
Number of Workers 
United 
States 
Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture (12,460) 1,478 (39,042) 14,744  (20,701) 202,605 
Mining (3,251) (1,505) (19,685) (2,486) (553) 29,499 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco (3,452) (3,049) (18,987) 1,953  (3,658) 16,172 
Textiles (6,028) (2,060) 57,999 206  (2,251) (2,133)
Wearing Apparel (16,804) (2,089) 244,675 (163) (3,687) 818 
Leather products & Footwear 620 (650) 11,090 301  (1,000) 10,500 
Wood & Wood Products 2,502 (166) (19,314) 561  538 (6,481)
Chemicals 2,883 (1,014) (16,078) (3,018) 1,334 (393)
Non-metallic Min. Products 957 (52) (7,194) (749) 1,372 (2,081)
Metal Products 2,024 (151) (10,672) 3,512  1,782 (3,014)
Transportation Equipment 2,970 5,206 (2,171) 114  16,633 (7,730)
Machinery & Equipment 21,830 2,450 (8,320) 1,611  2,489 (20,176)
Other Manufactures 2,148 (149) (1,828) (20) (177) (532)
Elec., Gas & Water (228) (81) (410) 293  36 179 
Construction (88) (39) (14,623) (1,306) 622 (11,433)
Trade & Transport 1,991 2,952 (62,175) (2,705) 9,799 (74,080)
Other Private Services 2,788 229 (11,146) (154) (2,190) (4,712)





Canada CAC Chile Mexico South 
America 
Agriculture -0.3 0.1 -1.0 1.9 -0.2 1.1 
Mining -0.5 -0.4 -21.2 -2.9 -0.5 2.9 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco -0.2 -0.6 -2.5 0.7 -0.2 0.4 
Textiles -0.6 -1.5 30.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.2 
Wearing Apparel -2.1 -1.3 44.8 -0.4 -2.3 0.1 
Leather products & Footwear 0.6 -2.2 17.0 1.1 -0.6 2.4 
Wood & Wood Products 0.1 -0.0 -9.4 0.4 0.1 -0.4 
Chemicals 0.1 -0.2 -6.1 -2.5 0.1 -0.0 
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.1 -0.0 -8.3 -2.2 0.4 -0.2 
Metal Products 0.1 -0.0 -9.2 3.4 0.4 -0.2 
Transportation Equipment 0.1 1.0 -8.0 0.4 2.8 -1.5 
Machinery & Equipment 0.4 0.3 -6.8 3.8 0.3 -2.4 
Other Manufactures 0.4 -0.2 -5.4 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 
Elec., Gas & Water -0.0 -0.0 -0.3 1.0 0.0 0.1 
Construction -0.0 -0.0 -1.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
Trade & Transport 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 
Other Private Services 0.0 0.0 -2.8 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Government Services 0.0 -0.0 -2.1 -0.9 -0.0 -0.4 
   
Table 12.  Global Welfare Effects of Bilateral Negotiating Options for Japan 
  
(Billions of Dollars and Percent 
GNP)           

















Japan 5.0 2.8 10.7 18.7 10.5 8.2 6.8 19.5 
United States 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -1.4 
Canada 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Australia 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
New Zealand 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
EU and EFTA 0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -2.8 
Hong Kong -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 
China 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.1 
Korea 0.0 -0.0 -0.2 2.2 -0.2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Singapore 0.6 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
Taiwan 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.1 
Malaysia -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
Philippines 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.9 -0.0 
Thailand 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.5 
Rest of Asia 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 
Chile 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
Mexico 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 3.3 -0.0 -0.1 
Central America and the Carribean (CAC) 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 
South America 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 
Morocco 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 



















Japan 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.4  
United States 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Canada 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Australia 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  
New Zealand 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  
EU and EFTA 0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Hong Kong -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  
China 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  
Korea 0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.4  -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Singapore 0.7  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.2  
Taiwan 0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1  
Indonesia 0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.1  
Malaysia -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.2  -0.0  -0.0  -0.2  
Philippines 0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.9  -0.0  
Thailand 0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.3  
Rest of Asia 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Chile 0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  
Mexico 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  -0.0  -0.0  
Central America and the Carribean (CAC) 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
South America 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
Morocco 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
   
Table 13.  Sectoral Employment Effects for Japan of Bilateral Negotiating Options 
  
(Number of Workers and Percent of 
Employment)         

















Agriculture (617) (4,478) (8,578) (9,008) (3,577) (3,000) (5,462) (19,994)
Mining 60 188 196 (364) (228) (83) (106) (202)
Food, Beverages & Tobacco (688) (4,080) (6,176) (5,893) (1,757) (1,061) (1,437) (18,178)
Textiles 182 176 (29) (3,080) (634) (338) 311 1,095 
Wearing Apparel (2) 30 (432) (1,423) (391) (86) (320) (518)
Leather products & Footwear (22) 33 (732) (1,317) (145) (65) (73) (183)
Wood & Wood Products 73 117 (4,489) (825) (2,684) (116) (155) (296)
Chemicals 38 373 1,186 1,132 169 (1) 237 3,122 
Non-metallic Min. Products 91 95 246 1,016 253 83 207 987 
Metal Products 460 798 2,670 2,576 1,899 512 790 4,988 
Transportation Equipment 500 1,214 8,079 (3,104) 9,102 926 2,165 12,379 
Machinery & Equipment 2,390 3,049 2,723 14,480 (3,583) 2,675 862 6,011 
Other Manufactures 22 42 7 (178) (55) 7 (67) 63 
Elec., Gas & Water 13 31 91 88 59 41 39 184 
Construction (51) 109 526 490 429 302 787 1,207 
Trade & Transport (2,260) 862 (515) 876 (2,189) (2,329) (51) (396)
Other Private Services (146) 409 1,485 1,376 602 1,052 621 2,375 



















Agriculture -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 
Mining 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 
Textiles 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 
Wearing Apparel 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Leather products & Footwear -0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Wood & Wood Products 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
Chemicals 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Non-metallic Min. Products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Metal Products 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Transportation Equipment 0.0 0.1 0.6 -0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.9 
Machinery & Equipment 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Other Manufactures 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 
Elec., Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Trade & Transport -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Private Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Government Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
   
Table 14.  Sectoral Employment Effects for Japan FTA Partner Countries 
  
(Number of Workers and Percent of 
Employment)         

















Agriculture 86 23,872 373,610 46,095 14,439 17,091 111,720 1,034,564 
Mining (5) (3,378) (14,970) (44) (517) (202) (1,919) (4,884)
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1,385 15,807 38,452 8,504 3,585 2,139 1,189 89,872 
Textiles (10) (768) (6,202) 10,558 390 (875) 1,947 (56,736)
Wearing Apparel 106 (376) 10,027 5,818 2,913 (279) 14,455 (80,148)
Leather products & Footwear 51 (317) 28,661 5,820 (23) (123) 2,169 (5,587)
Wood & Wood Products (145) (1,970) 39,158 (868) 11,665 (850) (2,565) (20,450)
Chemicals (205) (2,464) (30,953) (2,269) (4,552) (2,629) (5,869) (31,731)
Non-metallic Min. Products (48) (613) (10,341) (2,474) (1,521) (800) (3,681) (18,953)
Metal Products (430) (4,750) (29,701) (4,036) (4,579) (1,282) (4,299) (57,330)
Transportation Equipment (195) (1,544) (32,180) (1,251) (11,180) (2,074) (5,728) (23,004)
Machinery & Equipment (2,809) (2,894) (18,322) (17,068) 1,832 1,165 6,758 (19,945)
Other Manufactures (18) (114) (2,901) (237) (333) (254) (70) (9,951)
Elec., Gas & Water (19) (384) (1,798) (100) (177) (101) (997) (9,851)
Construction (106) (2,293) (30,482) (5,234) (3,628) (1,506) (26,648) (120,418)
Trade & Transport 2,332 (10,634) (195,924) (28,848) 6,096 6,602 (38,495) (430,875)
Other Private Services (244) (2,028) (7,742) (4,533) (3,499) (4,274) (11,163) (57,822)



















Agriculture 1.6 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.2 1.0 6.0 
Mining -0.8 -4.0 -1.7 -0.2 -1.4 -0.2 -1.6 -11.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 7.4 5.4 1.8 2.7 2.1 0.1 0.2 13.3 
Textiles -0.5 -1.7 -0.4 2.5 0.6 -0.2 1.0 -8.4 
Wearing Apparel 1.1 -1.0 1.0 2.2 3.1 -0.2 3.0 -6.7 
Leather products & Footwear 3.9 -1.2 2.7 6.0 -0.3 -0.1 3.3 -7.1 
Wood & Wood Products -0.4 -1.5 2.0 -0.2 3.2 -0.2 -0.9 -9.2 
Chemicals -0.4 -2.1 -2.5 -0.5 -1.9 -0.3 -2.1 -12.0 
Non-metallic Min. Products -0.6 -1.8 -2.1 -1.3 -1.7 -0.3 -3.4 -9.5 
Metal Products -1.0 -4.6 -5.4 -0.8 -3.0 -0.3 -2.5 -17.0 
Transportation Equipment -0.5 -6.0 -9.5 -0.2 -14.3 -0.4 -7.8 -17.9 
Machinery & Equipment -1.4 -6.8 -3.1 -1.3 0.3 0.2 1.6 -7.0 
Other Manufactures -0.4 -3.2 -1.5 -0.3 -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -8.7 
Elec., Gas & Water -0.2 -1.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.7 -5.7 
Construction -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 -1.6 -6.2 
Trade & Transport 0.4 -0.8 -0.9 -0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.7 -8.1 
Other Private Services -0.1 -0.5 -1.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -1.7 -6.8 
Government Services 0.1 -0.4 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -0.7 -5.2 
Table 15.  Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs and Unilateral and Global Free Trade 



































1 Japan                 X X X X X X X X 11 
2 US X X X X X X X X                 10 
3 Canada               X                 8 
4 Australia       X                         9 
5 New Zealand                                 9 
6 EU and EFTA                                 4 
7 Hong Kong                                 7 
8 China                                 8 
9 Korea                       X         5 
10 Singapore   X             X               7 
11 Taiwan                                 5 
12 Indonesia                     X           12 
13 Malaysia                         X       6 
14 Philippines                             X   7 
15 Thailand             X                 X 6 
16 Rest of Asia                                 9 
17 Chile X             X   X             13 
18 Mexico               X           X     6 
19 CAC     X         X                 11 
20 South America               X                 10 
21 Morocco         X                       8 
22 SACU           X                     8 
No. of Positive 
Effects 14 20 2 6 22 11 6 8 20 9 4 11 12 9 21 4   
   
Unilateral and Global 
Free Trade 
Unilateral Free Trade Global 
FT No. of  
positive 
effects 
US JPN AUS KOR SGP IDN MYS PHL THA CH
L 
CAC MEX MOR SACU
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  
1 Japan   X                         X 15 
2 US X                           X 14 
3 Canada                             X 13 
4 Australia     X                       X 15 
5 New Zealand                             X 14 
6 
EU and 
EFTA                             
X 
15 
7 Hong Kong                             X 14 
8 China                             X 13 
9 Korea       X                     X 15 
10 Singapore         X                   X 15 
11 Taiwan                             X 15 
12 Indonesia           X                 X 15 
13 Malaysia             X               X 15 
14 Philippines               X             X 15 
15 Thailand                 X           X 14 
16 Rest of Asia                             X 15 
17 Chile                   X         X 15 
18 Mexico                       X     X 14 
19 CAC                     X       X 15 
20 
South 
America                             
X 
15 
21 Morocco                         X   X 15 
22 SACU                           X X 14 
No. of Positive Effects 20 19 21 21 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 20 21 22 22  
Notes: 1) Shaded cells indicate countries with positive welfare effects while white cells indicate countries with negative welfare effects. 
2) "X" indicates unilateral free trade 
countries. 
Table 16.  Welfare Effects of Unilateral and Global Free Trade 
(Billions of Dollars and Percent of GNP) 
Unilateral Free Trade Global 
$ (Billions) United States Japan Australia Korea Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Chile Mexico CAC Morocco SACU Free Trade 
Japan 21.9 200.3 4.1 7.6 0.6 8.1 5.8 5.3 11.8 1.6 2.7 4.6 1.1 2.5 401.8 
United States 320.2 10.6 2.3 11.8 1.6 7.1 2.6 9.7 8.0 2.0 -5.2 9.1 1.9 3.2 542.5 
Canada -9.7 0.9 0.3 1.7 0.2 0.9 0.3 1.4 1.0 0.2 -0.6 0.8 0.2 0.3 50.1 
Australia 5.4 3.0 4.6 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 30.1 
New Zealand 1.3 1.4 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 11.5 
EU and EFTA 128.9 33.4 4.0 20.8 3.4 13.6 6.7 15.1 14.9 3.1 12.2 8.3 5.3 8.5 796.2 
Hong Kong 5.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.2 18.1 
China 5.3 -4.3 1.1 -1.0 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 105.0 
Korea 5.0 0.5 0.8 34.9 0.1 2.3 0.4 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.8 73.2 
Singapore 2.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 19.9 
Taiwan 4.9 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 60.7 
Indonesia 2.2 1.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 11.9 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 25.8 
Malaysia 1.1 0.6 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.5 4.0 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 18.2 
Philippines 1.6 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 7.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 17.0 
Thailand 2.3 -0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 14.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 27.4 
Rest of Asia 3.7 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 40.8 
Chile 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 10.8 
Mexico -5.6 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 26.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 33.6 
Central America 
and the Carribean 
(CAC) 4.0 1.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 6.2 0.0 0.1 17.7 
South America 4.7 2.8 0.3 2.3 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.7 0.4 1.0 96.5 
Morocco 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 4.8 
Southern African 
Customs Union 
(SACU) 1.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 13.6 15.5 
Total 507.0 258.0 19.3 88.0 9.0 50.0 25.6 46.8 61.9 15.2 40.0 33.7 11.3 32.3 2,417.3 
   
Unilateral Free Trade Global 
Percent United States Japan Australia Korea Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Chile Mexico CAC Morocco SACU Free Trade 
Japan 0.4  3.7  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  7.4  
United States 3.2  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  5.4  
Canada -1.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  6.2  
Australia 1.1  0.6  0.9  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  6.0  
New Zealand 1.6  1.7  -0.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  14.0  
EU and EFTA 1.2  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  7.3  
Hong Kong 2.9  0.5  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  10.2  
China 0.5  -0.4  0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.6  
Korea 0.9  0.1  0.1  6.3  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  13.2  
Singapore 2.3  0.9  0.1  0.9  1.2  0.6  1.8  0.8  1.6  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.1  21.0  
Taiwan 1.3  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  15.9  
Indonesia 0.8  0.6  0.1  0.4  0.0  4.5  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.7  
Malaysia 0.8  0.4  0.1  0.8  0.3  0.4  3.0  0.4  0.7  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  13.7  
Philippines 1.7  0.6  0.1  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.2  7.6  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  17.1  
Thailand 1.2  -0.3  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  7.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  13.7  
Rest of Asia 0.5  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.8  
Chile 0.9  0.5  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  5.4  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  11.3  
Mexico -1.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  5.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  6.7  
CAC 3.4  1.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  5.1  0.0  0.1  14.8  
South America 0.3  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  5.3  
Morocco 1.2  1.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  3.5  0.1  10.9  
SACU 0.6  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  7.4  8.5  
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